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Refugee Law Is Not Immigration Law
by James C. Hathaway
James C. Hathaway, Professor of Law and Director of the Program in Refu-
gee and Asylum Law at the University of Michigan, argues that the failure of
Australia and other actors to agree on responsibility for examining asylum
claims of boat refugees had less to do with gaps in international refugee law
than with lack of consensus about responsibility sharing obligations.
The spectacle of the governments of Australia, Indo-
nesia, and Norway playing pass the parcel with 400
refugees, most of them Afghans, is not an edifying
one... Yet the issues of responsibility, over which the
three governments are arguing, are important ones
which, left unsettled in this and other cases, could
only worsen the prospects for all refugees in the longer
run.  For the truth is that when what agreement has
been painfully achieved between nations on how to
deal with refugees breaks down, the natural reaction
is to erect even higher barriers than already exist.1
In the late days of August 2001, an extraordinarysaga was played out in the Indian Ocean betweenIndonesia and Australia.2   A routine surveillance flight
by Australia’s Coastwatch on August 25 detected a 60-foot
(20-m) wooden boat in distress northwest of Australia’s
Christmas Island territory.  Because the vessel was within
the Indonesian search and rescue zone, Australia alerted
officials in Jakarta to the situation.  The next day, another
Coastwatch flight observed the fishing boat still in trouble,
this time with the letters “SOS” marked on the roof of the
craft’s cabin.  Australian authorities decided to take matters
into their own hands, and broadcast a call to merchant ships
in the vicinity to render assistance to the sinking boat and
the 80 persons believed to be onboard.  A nearby Singapore-
bound container ship of Norwegian registry, the MV Tampa,
responded to the call.  Arriving onsite at the incapacitated
KM Palapa 1, the Tampa’s master, Captain Arne Rinnan, dis-
covered that there were in fact five times as many passen-
gers on the vessel as he had been told—some 433 persons,
mostly from Afghanistan, but also smaller numbers from
Iraq, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan.  All were rescued by the crew
of the Tampa.  Captain Rinnan then inquired of the Austra-
lian authorities where the rescuees should be taken.  The
Coastwatch responded that it did not know.
Left to his own devices, the captain initially de-
cided that because the Palapa had embarked from Indone-
sia, he would take the rescuees back to the Indonesian port of
Merak.  But after five men threatened to jump overboard if
returned to Indonesia, he changed course toward Australia’s
Christmas Island, the nearest harbor.  As the Tampa approached
Christmas Island, however, it was instructed by Australian of-
ficials to turn back toward Indonesia.  Fearful of exposing his
crew and the rescuees to the dangers of a severely overloaded
ship on the open ocean, Captain Rinnan disobeyed the Aus-
tralian order and instead held his position some 13.5 nautical
miles from the shore of Christmas Island—just outside
Australia’s territorial seas.
The Australian government was adamant that the
ship could proceed no further.  Of the view that the rescuees
were properly the responsibility of either Norway, the
Tampa’s flag state, or of Indonesia, the Palapa’s place of reg-
istry, Australia threatened the Tampa with massive fines were
it to approach Christmas Island.  The government then or-
dered the closure of Flying Fish Cove, the port of Christmas
Island.  The harbor master signed an order prohibiting all boat
movements into and out of the cove, and erected barriers at
the end of the jetty.  Captain Rinnan’s urgent pleas to send a
boat from shore to collect the sickest people were ignored.
Two days later, Captain Rinnan, fearing imminent
deaths onboard, took the Tampa into Australian territorial
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An unidentified Afghan man leans against the chain-link fence of a refugee camp after arriving with other
asylum seekers on the island of Nauru in September 2001.  Some 500 refugees were rescued from sinking
boats north of Australia.   Photo:  AP/R. Rycroft
waters, stopping four nautical miles from the shores of
Christmas Island.  Within two hours, 45 soldiers from the
Australian Special Armed Services boarded the ship.  While
the soldiers’ purpose was ostensibly to provide medical as-
sistance to the rescuees and to ensure the security of the
ship’s crew, the Special Armed Services troops also relieved
Captain Rinnan of control of the Tampa.  The next day, the
Norwegian ambassador was allowed to visit the Tampa.  The
rescuees made clear to him that they were seeking recogni-
tion of their refugee status, explicitly invoking their right to
be protected under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention.
The Responses
In response to the standoff near Christmas Island, two le-
gally absolutist strategies were advanced on the Australian
mainland.  On August 29, the same day that Australian
troops took control of the Tampa, the Australian govern-
ment tabled the Border Protection Bill 2001.  Passed in less
than one hour by the House of Representatives, this bill
purported retrospectively to authorize the use of “reason-
able force” against any ship just inside the Australian terri-
torial sea to force that ship outside the territorial sea.  Aus-
tralian officers were given “absolute discretion” to imple-
ment the law.  Critically, the bill provided that no person
onboard a ship subject to removal would have any remedy
against Australia, and moreover that no such person could
seek recognition of his or her refugee status.  This bill—
which was to have operated “in spite of any other law”—
was, however, defeated in the Australian Senate in the early
hours of the next morning.3
A no-less-determined legal strategy was launched
by refugee advocates on August 31. On the basis of the al-
leged unlawfulness of the detention by Australia of the asy-
lum seekers aboard the Tampa, the Federal Court of Austra-
lia was asked to issue writs of habeas corpus and mandamus
to require the government to bring the rescuees to Austra-
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lia where they would be entitled to enter that country’s refu-
gee determination system.  The applicants initially prevailed
before Justice North, who issued a writ of habeas corpus on
September 11,  requiring all the asylum seekers to be brought
to the Australian mainland.  A week later, however, a ma-
jority of the Full Federal Court reversed his order, affirm-
ing the prerogative power of the Australian government
to act outside the scope of its own immigration laws
where necessary to prevent the unauthorized entry of
non-citizens.
Even as these court proceedings were unfolding,
the Australian government proceeded to negotiate an in-
terstate arrangement whereby the asylum seekers would be
taken to other countries.  On September 3, all those who
had been rescued from the Palapa were transferred from
the Tampa to the HMAS Manoora, an Australian amphibi-
ous  troop ship with extensive medical facilities onboard.
The original plan was to sail to Port Moresby in Papua
New Guinea, from whence about one-third of the asy-
lum seekers (primarily family groups) would be flown
to New Zealand, which had agreed to allow all persons
determined by the New Zealand government to be genu-
ine refugees to remain in its territory.  The remaining
two-thirds of the refugee claimants would be taken to
the tiny and impoverished island nation of Nauru, where
they would be temporarily admitted in exchange for a
payment of about $7 million (13 million Australian dol-
lars) worth of fuel, about $1.6 million (3 million Austra-
lian dollars) for new generators, the
cancellation of about $540,000 (1
million Australian dollars) worth
of hospital bills run up by
Nauruans in Australia, refurbish-
ment of the island’s sports oval,
and the provision of sporting and
educational scholarships for
Nauruans to come to Australia.  In
Nauru, the asylum seekers would
be housed in a makeshift camp
under the guard of a private Aus-
tralian security firm while their
claims were assessed by the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR).  Those found to be
entitled to protection would be
admitted to Australia or resettled
to other countries, including
Norway, Sweden, and Canada.
While the Full Federal
Court of Australia was deliberat-
ing whether to reverse Justice
North’s original order, the Manoora
was already carrying the asylum
seekers away from Australia.  In-
stead of proceeding to Papua New
Guinea as originally planned, the
Manoora sailed directly to Nauru,
where it arrived on September
18—the very day on which the Full
Federal Court issued its decision
to vacate the writ of habeas corpus.
In addition to the refugee claim-
ants rescued on August 26, the
Manoora carried an additional 237
(largely Iraqi) asylum seekers
taken from another Indonesian
fishing boat, the Aceng, which
was intercepted before reaching
Australian territory.
A young Iraqi asylum seeker in Bogor, Indonesia weeping after more than
350 persons, mostly Iraqis and Afghans, drowned off the Indonesian coast
when their boat sank en route to Australia, August 2001.  Photo:  AP
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How Should the Situation Have Been Resolved
under International Refugee Law?
In my view, there is no basis in international refugee law to
justify the Australian government’s efforts mechanistically
to avoid responsibility by forcing the refugee claimants away
from its territorial waters, whether by the issuance of or-
ders to Captain Rinnan or by the effort to enact bluntly
exclusionary legislation.  But neither is there a basis in in-
ternational refugee law for the assertion of refugee advo-
cates that those rescued had a right to come to the Austra-
lian mainland in order to enter that country’s asylum sys-
tem.  Both these positions are unduly absolutist, and fail to
respect the careful compromise between the duty of pro-
tection and the continued sovereignty of states that is at
the core of the Refugee Convention.
The point of departure for legal analysis of this saga
is the Refugee Convention’s duty of nonrefoulement.4   This
duty not to return refugees directly or indirectly to the risk
of being persecuted inheres prior to the formal verification
of refugee status, and continues until and unless those who
claim to be refugees are fairly and finally determined not
so to qualify.  As a simple matter of logic, this must be so.
Otherwise, it would be open to a state party to avoid its freely
assumed duties under the Refugee Convention by the simple
expedient of refusing ever to inquire whether an individual
seeking to invoke treaty rights qualifies as a refugee or not.
It is, of course, true that the rights set by the Refu-
gee Convention are those only of genuine Convention refu-
gees, not of every person who claims to be a refugee.  But
because it is one’s de facto circumstances, not the official
validation of those circumstances, that gives rise to Con-
vention refugee status,5  genuine refugees could clearly be
irreparably disadvantaged by the withholding of protection
against refoulement pending status assessment.  Unless sta-
tus assessment is virtually immediate, the adjudicating state
may therefore be unable to meet its duty to implement the
Refugee Convention in good faith unless it grants at least
the most basic Convention rights to refugees on a strictly
provisional basis.
Not only does the right to protection against re-
foulement inhere before status determination, but it applies
as soon as a refugee comes under the de jure or de facto
jurisdiction of a state party.  In contrast to those rights which
are available only to refugees who are physically present
inside a state’s territory, the Refugee Convention grants Ar-
ticle 33 protection to “refugees” without any qualification
based on level of attachment to the asylum state.6   This
approach to refugee law coincides neatly with the more
general view that there is no principled reason to release
states which act extraterritorially from legal obligations
that would otherwise circumscribe the scope of their au-
thority.  According to international human rights expert
Theodor Meron,
In view of the purposes and objects of human
rights treaties, there is no a priori reason to
limit a state’s obligation to respect human
rights to its national territory.  Where agents
of the state, whether military or civilian, ex-
ercise power and authority (jurisdiction, or
de facto jurisdiction) over persons outside
national territory, the presumption should be
that the state’s obligations to respect the per-
tinent human rights continues.  That pre-
sumption could be rebutted only when the
nature and content of a particular right or
treaty language suggest otherwise.7
Finally, the substance of the duty of nonrefoulement
proscribes a pushing away from state territory, just as much
as an ejection from that territory after entry.  As the Ameri-
can representative to the committee which drafted Art. 33
clearly observed,
Whether it was a question of closing the fron-
tier to a refugee who asked admittance, or of
turning him back after he had crossed the
frontier, or even of expelling him after he had
been admitted to residence in the territory,
the problem was more or less the same.  What-
ever the case might be, whether or not the
refugee was in a regular position, he must
not be turned back to a country where his life
or freedom could be threatened.8
Indeed, the Belgian co-sponsor of the adopted text
emphasized that the duty had been expanded to an under-
taking “not to expel or in any way [return] refugees...”9  pre-
cisely to ensure that it was understood that the article “...
referred to various methods by which refugees could be
expelled, refused admittance or removed.”10
Because of the comprehensive and consequence-
oriented nature of the duty of nonrefoulement, both Norway
and Australia were under legal obligations to protect the
rescuees, duties that neither state appears fully to have rec-
ognized.  Specifically, when Captain Rinnan took the refu-
gees aboard the Tampa, the rescuees clearly were under the
jurisdiction of the ship’s flag state, Norway.  In what may seem
a cruel irony, the minimum condition for the imposition on
Norway of the duty to respect the principle of nonrefoulement—
that is, jurisdiction—was satisfied.  As soon as the Tampa’s
master could reasonably have become aware that his involun-
tary passengers were in flight from the risk of being perse-
cuted, Norway’s obligations under refugee law were engaged.11
And even though Australia seems to have believed
that ordering Captain Rinnan not to enter its territorial sea—
which forced him to remain 13.5 nautical miles offshore
for two days—somehow insulated Australia from responsi-
bility to protect the refugees, this may not have been so.  A
U.S. COMMITTEE for REFUGEES
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sound case can be made that even though at this point the
Tampa was still outside Australian territorial waters, primary
legal responsibility to protect the refugees onboard none-
theless passed from Norway to Australia.  At 13.5 miles off
the coast of Christmas Island, the Tampa was inside
Australia’s self-declared “contiguous zone.”
Having asserted the international right to enforce
its immigration laws within this zone extending 24 miles
from its coastline, Australia’s authority to exercise jurisdic-
tion should logically be understood to be subject to its gen-
eral international legal obligations, in-
cluding those under the Refugee Con-
vention.  While no refugee within the
contiguous zone is “inside” Australia
(which would give rise to additional en-
titlements under international refugee
law), jurisdiction alone is, for reasons
previously discussed, sufficient to en-
gage the duty of nonrefoulement.  Thus,
the determined effort to keep the Tampa
outside Australian territorial waters,
while perhaps important to avoid en-
gaging a broader range of Australian do-
mestic legal obligations, should in prin-
ciple be deemed insufficient to escape
international legal responsibility.
The issue of the international
legal significance of entry into
Australia’s contiguous zone, however,
became moot once the Tampa, fearing
the serious deterioration of onboard
conditions, entered Australia’s territorial
seas, clearly a part of Australian terri-
tory for purposes of international law.
Under international law, the entry of the
refugees into Australia’s territory ex-
panded their range of provisional en-
titlements to include rights to religious
freedom, access to rationing and pri-
mary educational systems, to receive identity documents,
and to exemption from penalization for illegal entry.
Perhaps most significantly, Australia was also at
this point prohibited from imposing limits on the freedom
of movement of the refugee claimants unless able to justify
the restrictions.  Under Art. 31(2) of the Refugee Conven-
tion, authorities are allowed to detain refugees only for rea-
sons generally agreed to be justified, including the need to
satisfy themselves of an asylum seeker’s identity, or to de-
termine whether or not he or she presents a security risk to
the asylum state.  The refugee must, of course, submit to all
necessary investigations of his or her claim to protection,
and file whatever documentation or statements are reason-
ably required to verify the claim to refugee status.  But once
any such prerequisite obligations have been discharged, the
refugee’s presence has been regularized in the receiving state,
and refugee-specific restrictions on freedom of movement
must come to an end.12   This critical international legal
limitation on the right of states to detain refugees appears
not even to have been considered in adjudicating the ap-
plication for habeas corpus in the Federal Court.
However, the legality of Australia’s decision to force
the refugees to leave its territorial sea aboard the Manoora,
rather than admitting them to its refugee status determina-
tion system, turns on a more subtle question. This is be-
cause no refugee has the right to be granted “asylum,” un-
derstood in the sense of access to a per-
manent or durable status in the state
to which his or her protection request
is addressed.  Until and unless a refu-
gee meets the requirements for protec-
tion against expulsion under Art. 32—
namely, that he or she is “lawfully in
[the state party’s] territory” —the gov-
erning provisions are Arts. 31 and 33
of the Refugee Convention.  Under the
combination of these provisions, a state
party is not precluded from expelling a
refugee claimant from its territory dur-
ing the earliest phases of refugee recep-
tion.  It is only barred from doing so
mechanistically, or without scrupulous
regard for the simultaneously appli-
cable duty of nonrefoulement.13
This understanding of the
Refugee Convention is not universally
shared.  Bill Frelick of the U.S. Com-
mittee for Refugees has recently made
an eloquent case that while the Refu-
gee Convention “does not... explicitly
promise asylum,” an effective duty to
assimilate persons determined to be
refugees may nonetheless be asserted
based on “... the suasive power of non-
binding language” in Art. 34 of the
Refugee Convention.14
But Frelick errs in suggesting that there is an “...
unmistakable emphasis [in] the Convention... on a refugee’s
willingness to return.  The Convention... does not limit its
protection only to persons for whom objective conditions
make it impossible to return; instead, it specifically directs
states to recognize a refugee’s willingness or unwillingness
to return based on his or her fear, as its guide.”15   This is not
so: the notion of a “well-founded fear of being persecuted” is
not an invitation to treat asylum seekers differently based upon
their level of trepidation or subjective apprehension, but is
rather a direction to evaluate the objective soundness of their
forward-looking apprehension of risk.  This interpretation
is not only consistent with the human rights context and
objects and purposes of the Refugee Convention itself,16
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Convention’s clauses on cessation of refugee status due to
(objective) change of circumstances.  Frelick’s analysis
pointedly ignores Arts. 1(C)(5) and 1(C)(6), which allow
states to withdraw refugee status on the basis of a purely
objective assessment of present risk without reference to
subjective apprehension or voluntariness.17
Assuming, then, that the Tampa refugees were
present, but not “lawfully present,” in Australian territory
by virtue of their entry into the territorial waters around
Christmas Island, refugee law posed no impediment to
Australia sending the rescuees from the Tampa onward to
New Zealand: there were clear guarantees made of admis-
sion to that country’s highly regarded status-determination
system, and no practice there that would suggest a risk of
refoulement.  However, the sending of refugees to Nauru, a
non-state party with no history of refugee reception and
no government structures in place to oversee refugee pro-
tection, was less obviously a legally responsible act.  It none-
theless appears in fact that the refugees sent to Nauru were
not thereby subjected by Australia to the risk of indirect
refoulement.  Not only is it difficult to imagine how the
refugees would leave Nauru in practical terms, but the con-
ditions there—while not ideal—are unlikely to be deemed
sufficiently egregious to have effectively forced away any
of the rescuees who in fact were to leave Nauru.18
The more vexing question is whether Australia
breached international law by effectively divesting the refu-
gees of the ability to assert rights under the Convention
which they had by virtue of their former presence in areas
under the jurisdiction of (and subsequently, within the ter-
ritory of) a state party to the Convention.
While they had acquired only a minimal set of
refugee rights in Australia, even those entitlements disap-
peared upon arrival in Nauru.19   Whatever protection they
enjoy de facto in Nauru is entirely vulnerable to the exer-
cise of political discretion in a way that would not be true
in a state party to the Convention.  But on balance, the
flexibility which inheres in states by virtue of the limited
applicability of Art. 32 of the Convention suggests that there
is no clear legal basis to contest the Australian reallocation
scheme.  If the refugees were never lawfully present on Aus-
tralian territory (including in its territorial waters), sending
them onward to a non-state party is within the bounds of the
Refugee Convention so long as there is no foreseeable risk of
direct or indirect refoulement.  The gap between refugee law
and immigration law is thus perhaps all too clear.
What More General Lessons Should Be Learned?
The most basic lesson, of course, is that the existing legal
rules of refugee protection can, in most cases—assuming
both state accession and good faith application—ensure
that the most basic interests of refugees are met in a way
that is non-absolutist, yet comprehensive.  So long as ju-
risdiction is understood to be a sufficient connection to
engage the duty of nonrefoulement, it is really only when refu-
gees are located on the high seas that they may fall outside
the purview of the existing refugee law regime.  And even
on the high seas, as analysis of this case shows, refugee law
responsibilities will follow automatically when actions are
taken in line with international legal duties to establish
search-and-rescue zones, and to respond to distress calls by
rescuing refugees at risk on the high seas.
My point is not that this is a fail-safe protection
system—refugees at risk do go undetected on the high seas,
and even on land, state participation in the Refugee Con-
vention is less than universal.  But the much more frustrat-
ing problem—precisely because it is so much more readily
remediable—is the absence of a shared understanding of
the ways in which existing rules play out in particular fac-
tual contexts, and of a concomitant determination by the
international supervisory authority, UNHCR, to bring those
rules to bear rather than simply encouraging states to “re-
solve the impasse” among themselves.  Yet sadly, the inter-
national community seems determined to reinvent the
wheel each time a major refugee crisis emerges, resorting to
ad hoc arrangements which may or may not work in time to
ensure that refugees are not left unprotected or worse.
But even if we can reach a consensus that rules of
international refugee law do matter; even if we can agree on
the ways in which those rules are to be applied in practice;
and even if the UNHCR can be convinced that it must never
waver from the promotion of refugee law as the irreducible
minimum foundation for the resolution of protection chal-
lenges; we are still left with a fundamental dilemma.  The
fact that a state party which has jurisdiction over a refugee
automatically owes that person respect for a core set of es-
sential rights, including to protection against refoulement, is
a critical strength of refugee law:  for the reasons described
above, it ensures that few refugees fall through the cracks of
the protection regime.  Yet precisely because jurisdiction
alone is sufficient to assign full legal responsibility for the
refugee to a single state, the existing mechanisms of inter-
national protection appear absolutist in a way that is both
unprincipled and unsustainable.
The saga of the Tampa illustrates neatly some of
the unresolved inequities in the application of legal rules
to protect refugees.  After all, Australia only became involved
because it had been willing to patrol an area of the high
seas which the state with true responsibility, Indonesia, had
negligently failed to oversee.  Why should Australia be pe-
nalized because it took steps beyond its formal duties re-
sponsibly to issue a distress call which saved the lives of the
passengers of the Palapa?  More generally, why should Aus-
tralia, as one of the very few state parties to the Refugee
Convention in the region, be put in the position of needing
to pick up responsibilities more logically understood to be
regional, or indeed global,  in nature?  And even if Australia’s
greater wealth and stability are said to justify a special re-
sponsibility, was it really fair that Norway—an equally pros-
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perous and stable state, but much farther from most refu-
gee-producing regions—was able to escape its duties by the
act of its captain taking his ship into Australian waters with-
out that country’s authorization?
But on the other hand, why should Norway have
been saddled with sole responsibility for the welfare of the
refugees just because a ship flying its flag happened to be
nearest to the site of the tragedy?  And what if the captain
of that ship had not been a person of sufficient courage to
take onboard many more drowning passengers than his
vessel could safely accommodate; or if the owners of the
ship had pressured the captain to exercise his discretion
negatively so as to avoid what became in fact very serious
delays in the delivery of its $20 million cargo?
Perhaps most fundamental of all, why should the
refugees have been forced to trek halfway around the world
in order to present their refugee claims to a country from
which they believed meaningful protection would be forth-
coming?  And once having found a way to enter Australian
jurisdiction, why should the refugees effectively lose their
acquired refugee rights by virtue of an arguably legal trans-
fer of responsibility for them to the government of Nauru,
a state which is not a party to the Refugee Convention?  But
on the other hand, should these refugees— who black-
mailed Captain Rinnan by threats of suicide to head for
Australia—be entitled to benefit from their threats?  And
why should this small group of Afghans be the subject of
special concern?  At least on Nauru their basic safety is as-
sured, in contrast to that of the many long-suffering Af-
ghan refugees who could not afford to travel to Australia or
were otherwise unable to flee their own region.
The seeming arbitrariness of the way in which refu-
gee law would have apportioned duties and granted rights
in the case of the Palapa refugees is in critical ways linked
to the complaints traditionally voiced by the countries of
South and Southeast Asia (among others) through which
the Afghans of the Palapa, as well as the Iraqis of the Aceng,
likely passed.  Given their geographical position in a part
of the world exposed to seemingly endemic flows of large
numbers of genuine refugees, why would they sign on to
the Refugee Convention, thereby exposing themselves to
sole legal responsibility to honor the rights of whatever refu-
gees show up at their frontiers?  Why should these coun-
tries be expected to rely on vague promises of voluntary
assistance from UNHCR or other states—which usually ar-
rives late, if at all?  Without real guarantees of support,
would it not be irresponsible for them to assure their own
populations that acceding to the Refugee Convention will
not, in practice, result in the sorts of serious chaos faced by
other states (such as Tanzania, Democratic Republic of
Congo, and Pakistan) which attempted to play by the rules
of international refugee law?
Thus it is that refugee protection—in both the less
developed and in the developed worlds—is in serious
trouble, not because of any fundamental flaw in the actual
rules of international law which in principle govern the
treatment of refugees, but because of the failure of the in-
ternational community to commit itself to a clearly depend-
able and visibly fair system under which burdens and re-
sponsibilities are shared within the bounds of those legal
commitments.  This is not a call for new rules, but rather
for new structures of implementation within which the rules
will be understood by states to be reconcilable to their most
basic interests.   There are clear and workable proposals on
the table to achieve precisely these ends,20  but that is exactly
where they have remained.21   Ironically, much creative think-
ing has been devoted to learning the lessons from the experi-
ences of sharing initiated in Southeast Asia during the crisis of
the boat people more than 20 years ago, fine-tuned in mecha-
nisms later employed in Africa and Latin America.
If we fail to systematize a process of collectivized
protection, we invite criticism of refugee law itself, rather
than of its implementation mechanisms.  Worse still, we
invite de facto withdrawal from refugee law.  For example,
in the wake of the Palapa events, Australia has enacted sev-
eral new pieces of legislation22  which inter alia purport to
excise Christmas Island and a number of other remote ter-
ritories from Australia for refugee law purposes; radically
reduce access to the courts by refugees; and redefine by leg-
islative fiat core portions of the supposedly non-derogable
international legal definition of a “refugee.”  The risk of
failing to take principled action to stave off such defensive
measures, or at least clearly to de-legitimate the rhetoric of
unfairness which accompanies them, is thus all too real.
We simply cannot afford to persist in the usual pattern of
vague understandings of legal duties coupled with ad hocery
in its implementation.
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